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For roughly sixty years, by means political, military, and media, Pakistan’s political elite has
curbed the Supreme Court from snooping around in their affairs. Corruption flourished.
Then came the 2016 Panama revelations. The Court dethroned Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif for charges linked to his financial infidelity. Corruption flourished a little less.
On a wintery day in late February 2018, Pakistan’s Supreme Court lashed out against
Nawaz Sharif once more. This time, they disqualified him from presiding over a right-wing
conservative alliance, the Pakistan Muslim League Noon, PML (N), for short; the same
political party, Sharif once tamed and moulded into a fiercely loyal group of rubber-
stamping vassals. The Court also invalidated all decision Nawaz Sharif had taken as party
chief of the PML (N). This included the nomination of twenty-three candidates to the
upcoming Senate elections, which leaves PML (N) candidates without any formal
institutional umbrella. The party symbol on the ballot cards next to the candidates’ names
was hastily changed from the PML(N) tiger to a generic pick-up truck (in case you are
wondering: elephants were taken).
There is also another way of telling this story. In this narrative, the Supreme Court is not a
naïve rule-of-law perpetuating lamb but more bullish. When in 2009, Pakistan’s last military
dictator Pervez Musharraf quarrelled with a former chief justice of the Court, the ensuing
‘civil’ protest movement led to Musharraf’s downfall. The Court had tasted blood. Now it is
breathing down heavy on the government’s neck. So much so, that a squeamish Nawaz
Sharif lamented in front of his interviewers: “The Court took rulership (sadaarat) from me
last July. Now the Court has barred me from running my own political party. All I have left is
my name: Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. But I’m sure the Court will soon find a provision in the
Black Law Dictionary to strip me of this name as well.”
A number of legal observers have ebbed their applause for the Court’s unrestricted
interventionism. The timing of the ruling, so shortly before the Senate elections, has even
spurred discontent amongst impartial well-wishers. Has the Court ultimately dabbled into
murky political waters? The sixteen petitioners in the case spanned an unusually wide
political spectrum: from mud-slinging populists and polite liberal universalists, to fanatic
religious enthusiasts. Whenever such implausible political alliances join forces to identify
and demolish the personification of evil in a single person, any Court translating such
antagonism into the language of the law, would be hard pressed to appear politically
impartial.
The main reason for the petitioners’ frustration was the 2017 Election Act. Following last
year’s defeat at the Supreme Court, Nawaz Sharif strong-armed the Act through parliament
to secure his political afterlife as party head. With a sleight of hand, the Act brushed over
the section of the 2002 Political Parties Order that invalidated Nawaz’s leadership claim to
the PML(N) for not meeting the high standard of the honesty-clause. But like for the
membership of any parliamentary body, here too, lay enshrined the provision that the party
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head shall not have been “disqualified from being elected a chosen member of the Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament)”.
The petitioner-alliance forwarded their grudge in the following way: Article 63 (A) of the
Constitution, submitted “wide ranging powers” to the party head in “matters where Members
of his party vote or abstain from voting in the House”. Therefore, the petitioners concluded:
“a person who has been disqualified under the Constitution should not head a political party
or have the power to control Parliamentarians in the Senate of Pakistan, the National
Assembly and/or the Provincial Assembly”. Having a dishonest party chief leading honest
parliamentarians would defeat the very purpose of a constitutionally embedded honesty-
requirement.
For the PML(N)–government the case was not so clear. They held that freedom of speech,
particularly the freedom of citizens to organise themselves in political parties and to “freely
determine their association and choose office-bearers including Party Head”, outweighed
the 2002 Political Party Order, which was, in any case, historically outdated.
Enter the ruling. After copy-pasting almost the entirety of the Objective Resolutions (the
constitution’s preamble) to set the mood, the Court throws the reader into an Islamist
utopia, where “it is clear and obvious” that the “qualifications prescribed” for parliamentary
membership have “unmistakable Islamic underpinnings”.
Only a good Muslim makes a parliamentarian. The Court finds “this not hard to
understand”. The “constitutional intent” and “design”, that the Court was under
“constitutional obligation” to enforce, left no doubt that the “Legislative Units of the State”
had to be “purified” top-down to keep the “sacred trust” between Allah Almighty and
Pakistani parliamentarians alive.
The party head was not a common civilian. Rather, the Court reasoned, the party head
could declare that a parliamentarian had “deflected from the political party”––through Article
63(A)––and thus enjoyed special constitutional powers that justified the heightened level of
moral scrutiny he had to undergo.
But the Objective Resolution, from which the Court extrapolated much of their legal rational,
did not fall from heaven. History tells us, that on 12 March 1949 the Resolution was
rammed through the Constituent Assembly in record-speed, with a large number of
delegates already on their way home to the provinces. This lead to tumultuous scenes, with
a non-Muslim repeatedly pointing out: “Sir, there is no quorum in the House!”.
When it came to non-Muslims climbing up to high political offices, the key player in the
drafting process, Liaquat Ali Khan, who also introduced the Objective Resolution into the
Assembly, held a different view to what the current Supreme Court had to say. After being
challenged by a few non-Muslim delegates that his Objective Resolution would effectively
ban them from ascending to political leadership roles, Liaquat Khan observed dryly: “This is
absolutely wrong. A non-Muslim can be the head of the administration under a
constitutional government.”
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The Court has put itself in the awkward positon of policing parliamentarians’ “Islamic moral
standards [and knowledge]” (underlining not mine). As long as the Court directs this wobbly
legal concept against sentenced criminals and thugs, one could accept it as just another
quirk of a system still in its Sturm-und-Drang phase. If, however, the Court starts examining
the Islamic knowledge of parliamentarians through standardised tests, stuff that it could
easily justify with the same legal provisions, Pakistan’s in for a hell of a ride in the next
decade.
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